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Abstract 
This study investigates whether executives backdate share option grants to 
their advantage in South Africa. Using data of 175 option grants to executives 
among the 41 top companies in South Africa between 2001 and 2006, a 
pattern of negative cumulative abnormal stock returns before the grant dates 
but positive and increasing returns thereafter is observed. This pattern is much 
more pronounced for unscheduled grants. Statistical testing shows the mean 
cumulative abnormal returns are significantly different from zero after the grant 
date, but are not significantly different from zero before the grant date. The 
mean differences in average cumulative abnormal stock returns between pre-
and post- grant periods are significantly different. The results suggest that 
some opportunistic behavior might have taken place around the executive 
option grants, including backdating. 
Key words: Backdating, Executive share options, Executive compensation, 
Share option grants, Timing of share option grants. 
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Chapter I Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The backdating of stock options, which occurs when options are granted to 
executives on past dates chosen with the benefit of hindsight to be dates when 
the stock price was particularly low, is very topical in the U.S and has recently 
attracted increasing attention by scholars, regulators, shareholders and the 
media. 
The first academic study which indicates that company stock options to 
executives might have been backdated is Erik Lie (2005). By noting share 
prices fell before the option grant date and rose soon afterwards, Lie's paper 
suggests that at least some of the option grants were timed retroactively. Later 
academic studies, including Collins, Gong and Li (2005), Heron and Lie (2006a) 
and Narayanan and Seyhun (2005), give strong evidence that option 
backdating might have taken place. Academics indicate that the backdating 
inquiry could be one of the most widespread and significant corporate 
scandals in 30 years. 
The academic studies have attracted a great deal of attention from both media 
and regulators. With a report suggesting executives of six companies might 
have backdated their option grants published by the Wall Street Journal on 18 
March 2006, backdating became a fully fledged scandal. In the U.S, the State 
and Federal regulators have launched many investigations into companies 
over the possible manipulation and illegal reporting of stock option grants. 
These investigations have led to discoveries of the latest option scandals to 
shake corporate America. A number of companies have publicly acknowledged 
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issues relating to backdating option grants, and dozens of executives and 
directors have been forced to resign. 
The disclosure requirements for stock options in the U.S experienced a 
change in_ the reporting deadline. Prior to 29 August 2002, option grants 
meeting certain conditions could be reported on Form 5 which was required to 
be filed only within 45 days after the end of the company's fiscal year. Grants 
not meeting these conditions were reported on Form 4 which was required to 
be filed within the first 10 days of the month following the month of the grant. 
(Section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934). On 29 August 
2002, Section 403 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 became effective. 
The new rules mandated by Section 403 of SOX accelerate the filing deadline 
of Form 4 to be within two business days following the transaction date. 
Moreover, it requires that all executive stock option grants must now be 
reported on Form 4. A study conducted by Collins and Gong (2005) finds that 
the new reporting requirement of stock option grants greatly reduces the 
apparent use of backdating. Studies by Narayanan (2006a) and Erik Lie 
(2006b) find that the accelerated reporting requirement has not eliminated 
executive opportunistic behavior associated with stock option grants. 
1.2 Reasons for backdating 
There are several reasons for option backdating to take place:· 
Benefit incentive 
Executive stock options are usually granted at-the-money (strike price equal to 
the market price at the grant date). CEOs prefer to be granted options when 
the stock price is at its lowest, as the lower the exercise price the higher the 
option value. Such benefit incentives motivate executives to backdate the 
grants to dates with a lower market price, thereby inflating the value of the 
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options. Backdating represents a very effective and simple way of boosting the 
value of the awards. 
Lack of independence 
The role that the CEO plays on the board of directors suggests that they have 
the power to control the compensation committees and influence the timing of 
the option grants. 
Ambiguity 
Stock option plans are vague as to how the grant date should be determined, 
and do not specifically prohibit the grant date from preceding the decision date. 
It implies that backdating of executive stock options alone is not necessarily 
illegal under certain conditions. 
Discovery 
Usually, the individual stock option agreements are signed and dated by the 
employee-recipients; firms are not required to disclose the award dates in the 
proxy statements. It is difficult for outsiders to uncover backdating practices. 
1.3 Consequences of backdating 
Prior to SFAS 123R - Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
123(Revised) - becoming effective in the U.S, at-the-money option grants were 
not expensed and did not trigger any accounting consequence except for a 
footnote disclosure in terms of the accounting rules existing at the time. 
However, where an option was granted with an exercise price lower than the 
market price at the grant date (in-the-money grants), the company was 
required to recognize the compensation expense in the income statement over 
the vesting period of the option (the accounting and tax treatment of stock 
options is discussed in more detail later in this paper). The sole motive for 
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backdating a stock qption grant is to capture a lower exercise price and create 
built-in value for the option recipients. This turns an at-the-money grant to an 
in-the-money grant and often involves an adjustment of the financial 
statements to properly record the expense associated with option awards. 
Failure to restate the financial statements usually leads to several 
consequences: 
Forged documents 
Backdated forged minutes have to be prepared for filing to support the 
backdated grants. 
Tax issues 
One aspect of backdating stock options lies in the realm of taxes. There are tax 
consequences for both companies (option granters) and individuals (option 
recipients) resulting from the backdating of stock options. 
From the company's perspective, the option exercise price affects the basis on 
which the company estimates its compensation expense. Backdating option 
grants potentially lowers the exercise price thereby lowering the compensation 
expense. This will overstate the firm's pre-tax earnings and the company will 
needlessly pay more tax, robbing shareholders of wealth. A SEC press release 
alleged that from fiscal years 1997 through 2002, Engineered Support 
Systems Inc. did not recognize any compensation expense relating to stock 
option grants to the executives which were backdated, thus overstating its 
aggregate pre-tax operating income by approximately $26 million, or 21 %. 1 
Another case filed by SEC alleged that from fiscal years 1999 through 2001, 
1 SEC Press Release: SEC Files Actions against Fonner CFO and Fonner Controller of 
Engineered Support Systems, Inc., Relating to Options Backdating Scheme; 2007-15; Feb 6, 2007. 
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Brocade Communication Systems overstated its income, totaling $303 million, 
as a consequence of option backdating.2 
Further, as the at-the-money option grants are considered performance-based 
compensation, they are tax deductible for the firm. However, if the options are 
effectively in-the-money on the grant date, they might not qualify for tax 
deductions. 
For the individual, the option exercise price affects the basis on which the 
option recipient estimates capital gains and income tax. At-the-money option 
grants have no income tax implications. After the options are granted, any 
stock price increases above the option exercise price are treated as capital 
gains, and are subject to tax at a relatively low rate compared to gains of a 
revenue nature, which may be postponed until the exercised options are sold. 
In contrast, the in-the-money option grants have income tax implications. 
Academics refer to such grants as a windfall to option recipients. The windfall 
(the difference between market price and the exercise price at the time of the 
grant) is considered income for option recipients. Narayanan and Seyhun 
(2005) have pointed out that if the grant date is backdated by 20 days, large 
option (500,000shares or greater) recipients increase their value by about 10% 
($0. 7 million per grant). 
Inflated earnings 
As stated above, incorrect compensation expense records relating to 
backdated stock option grants, often inflate the earnings for the fiscal year of 
the grant, which could mislead outside investors and result in poor decisions. 
Harm to shareholders 
2 SEC Complaint, civil action No. 06-4435, available at : http:// www.sec.gov I litigation I 
complaints /2006/compl9768.pdf 
9 
Backdating option grants lowers the exercise price, reducing the money the 
firm should receive, and leaves the tax collector and the executives better off 
at the shareholders expense, thus harming shareholders. An academic study, 
using a sample of firms that have already been implicated in backdating, found 
that the granting of options via backdating resulted in an average loss to 
shareholders of about 7% in market capitalizations ($400 million per firm)3. 
1.4 Area of study 
Evidence in the U.S indicates that an increased use of stock options as 
executive remuneration results in managers taking greater risks, including 
backdating option grants to their advantage. The focus of this research will be 
to investigate whether there is similar opportunistic behavior from executives 
awarded share option grants by firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (the JSE) in South Africa. The scope will be to review data relating 
to executive share option grants for the top 41 listed companies by market 
capitalization on the JSE as at 30 November 2006 over the period of 2001 to 
2006. It was decided not to include all the firms listed on the JSE as thin 
trading for small companies has been observed and the low liquidity of shares 
causes the share prices to lack sensitivity or reflects market inefficiency. It was 
also decided not to include the options granted to junior management and 
ordinary employees as they have little or no power to control or influence 
option grants. It has been observed that the granting of share options in South 
Africa is at the discretion of senior management and the eligibility for share 
options extends to directors and senior managers. (Sacho,2003). The 
implementation of IFRS 2 with regard to share based payment in South Africa 
requires companies to disclose shares, share options or other equity 
instruments granted after 7 November 2002 in their annual financial reports. 
3 M.P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani and H. Nejat Seyhun, the Economic Impact of Backdating 
of Executive Stock Options, working paper, 2006, P2 
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Companies normally provide the prior year's information in their annual reports 
for comparative purposes, therefore data prior to 2001 is not readily available. 
1.5 Hypothesis 
The purpose of this paper is to establish whether stock option grants have 
been opportunistically manipulated by executives at South African listed public 
companies. On the basis of prior research and empirical evidence on the 
I 
backdating of stock opti~ns, it is hypothesized that: 
• Negative abnormal returns appear before option grants and positive 
abnormal returns appear thereafter; 
• A significant abnormal stock return reversal around the grant date is 
exhibited. 
1.6 Terminology and relevant abbreviations used 








"Stock options" and "Share options" . 
"Option grants" and " Option awards" 
"Compensation committee" and "Remuneration committee" 
"Exercise price" and "Strike price" 
"Executives" and "Executive directors" 
"Event date" and "Option grant date" 
"Abnormal stock (or share) return" and " Excess stock (or share) return" 






AAR: Average abnormal stock return 
AR: Abnormal stock return 
APB: Accounting Principles Board 
CAR: Cumulative abnormal stock return 
















CFO: Chief Financial Officer 
ESQ: Employee Share Option (The term "executive stock (or share) 
option" is also used in the literature) 
FASB: Financial Accounting Standards Board 
IAS: International Accounting Standards 
IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standards 
IRC: Internal Revenue Code 
ISO: Incentive stock option 
NQSO: Nonqualified stock option 
JSE: Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission 
SFAS: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
SOX: Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
UCTD: Union Catalogue for Thesis and Dissertations 
U.S: United States 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter two introduces 
executive stock option grants by describing the key features and the 
institutional background of the option grants. It also reviews related literature 
on CEOs opportunistically timing the option grants, backdating practice in the 
U.S. and salient features of stock options in South Africa. Chapter three briefly 
discusses the accounting and tax treatment of stock options in the U.S and 
South Africa. Chapter four discusses the potential research methodologies and 
the methodology selected for this paper. Chapter five describes the data and 
the significance tests to be used in this research. Chapter six presents the 
results of the study. Finally, chapter seven concludes. 
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Chapter II Literature review 
2.1 Executive stock option grants 
Stock options are characterized as instruments for aligning the long-term 
interests of shareholders and managers, forming the major share of 
performance-based incentive compensation received by CEOs in many 
companies worldwide. Options exploded during the bull market of the 1990s. 
In 1992, there were 940 option grants made by 126 firms in the U.S, totaling 17 
million shares. By 2002, the number of option grants had increased to 120,425, 
totaling 1.2 billion shares, made by 2,543 firms4. Most CEOs of the largest U.S 
companies now receive annual stock option awards that are larger on average 
than their salaries and bonuses combined. In contrast, in 1980 the average 
stock option grant represented less than 20% of direct pay and the median 
stock option grant was zero. 5 Sacho (2003) cited research conducted by 
Rosen in 2002, 65% to 70% of the total options granted in the U.S were 
granted to executive management, the research concluded that on the whole, 
most U.S companies did not grant share options broadly and that share 
options were concentrated at the top of the organization. He also cited a 1998 
U.S survey conducted by the Financial Markets Center and found that almost 
11% of U.S share options went to the CEO in 1998 and 21% went to the top 
five executives. David (2006) cited a survey conducted by Pearl Meyers & 
Partners in 2001, on average, stock options accounted for over two-thirds of 
the total compensation granted to CEOs of 200 large U.S public companies. 
Executive stock options (ESO), as pay instruments, are used by companies to 
4 Narayanan and Seyhun, 2005, Do Managers Influence their Pay? Evidence from Stock Price 
Reversals around Executive Option Grants. P34 
5 Hall, Brian J., "The Pay to Performance Incentives of Executive Stock Options" (July 1998). 
NBER Working Paper No. 6674, HBS Working Paper No. 99-002. P 1. 
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reward managers for long-term success. Companies issue stock options as an 
incentive for executives to improve their firms' performance and share prices. 
The options usually give executives the right to buy a number of their 
company's common stocks in the future at a stated exercise price. Typically 
the price is normally equivalent to the market value of the stock on the date of 
the grant, called at-the-money grants. A study by Murphy and Hall (2002) finds 
that 94% of the ESOs of S&P 500 companies in 1998 were granted 
at-the-money. 
Institutionally, the stock options awarded to top executives is administrated by 
the company's compensation committee, which is a sub-committee of the 
board of directors. The compensation committees review and determine the 
parameters of the stock option grants, such as the size and timing of stock 
option awards. These parameters differ substantially within companies and 
vary over time. Typically, the compensation committee holds three to five 
meetings per year relating to executive compensation issues. Finally it will be 
decided who is eligible and the size of the options. Most options are granted 
with an exercise price based upon the market price of the stock at the close of 
the trading on the day of this meeting. However, this option grants process is in 
reality not an arms-length transaction for the CEOs. Academics have pointed 
out CEOs have the power to control the compensation committees through 
various channels and influence the value of option compensation. Yermack 
( 1997) reports that many of Fortune 500 companies have CE Os who serve as 
members of their own compensation committees, and some companies have 
CEOs who sit on each other's compensation committees. Chauvin and 
Shenoy (2001) indicate that through inside information, executives know when 
compensation committee meetings are scheduled. Often top executives are 
given the opportunity to propose the parameters of the stock option grants.6 
6 Also see Erik Lie (2005) discussed that "three reasons suggest the executives affect the 
committee's decisiOns". 
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On 20 October 2006, CNNMoney news quoted a survey released by the 
Corporate Library, a corporate governance research firm, which states that of 
120 companies which have backdating scandal implications, 51 have directors 
sitting on more than one board, and additionally in this group, 43 directors on 
two boards and 9 directors on three boards7. 
The key feature of executive option awards is that the exercise price is usually 
equal to the market price on the grant date - the day the company's board of 
directors awards the options, i.e. stock options are usually granted 
at-the-money to the executives. Option compensation at the grant date is: 
Option compensation= (P-X)n 
Where P is the market price of the stock on the grant date, X is the exercise 
price determined on the date options are granted; n is the number of options 
granted. At-the-money option grants give executives zero value of option 
compensation at the grant date. Once the options have been granted, if the 
CEO makes any decision that increases the stock price, he exercises his 
options and captures a portion of the value created for shareholders. 
There are both accounting and tax reasons for granting the options 
at-the-money on the day of grant. 
In the U.S, prior to 15 June 2005, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
provided that firms had to recognize a compensation expense which was equal 
to the difference between the exercise price and the market price of the 
company's stock on the date of the option grant, for options issued for a fixed 
number of shares at a fixed exercise price. Under these accounting rules, an 
7 CNNMoney news: Shaheen Pasha, Pssst! Heard about how easy backdating is? 20 October 2006, 
10 :5 3AM EDT. Available at: H ttp://money.cnn.com/2006/ 10/20/news/companies/backdating_ 
study/index.htm. (Accessed: 22 /03/ 2007) 
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at-the-money option grant resulted in no expense being recognized for 
financial reporting purposes, thus triggering no accounting consequence 
except for footnote disclosure in the financial statements. On the other hand, 
an in-the-money option grant would result in the recognition of compensation 
expense, which would decrease pre-tax earnings. 
The relevant tax rules in the U.S provide that qualifying performance-based 
compensation is tax deductible for firms and limits the corporate deduction for 
non-performance based compensation paid to certain senior executives (the 
accounting and tax treatment of stock options is discussed in more detail later 
in this paper). Stock options which meet certain requirements automatically 
qualify as performance-based compensation; one of these requirements is that 
the options be granted at- or out-of-the-money. 
Other salient features of stock option grants are as follows: 
Vesting Period and Marketability 
Executive stock options differ from listed options in that there is usually a 
minimum holding period required before the options can be exercis~d. this 
restriction is known as the "vesting period". This means that the executives 
often do not gain control over the stock options for a period of time, usually 3 to 
5 years. During the vesting period, the stock options are not exercisable. In 
addition, the options are long-term in nature (typically ten years) and are 
strictly non-marketable. 
Self-interest influence 
Through various channels, CEOs have the power to control the compensation 
committees. Many companies have CEOs who served as members of their 
own compensation committees, some companies have CEOs who sat on each 
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other's compensation committees.8 Self-interest suggests that the CEOs exert 
influence over their own compensation, including the size, term, frequency and 
even the dating of stock option grants. "If the awards are unscheduled, 
executives might use their influence to time the awards on a date when the 
stock prices are particularly low ...... If the awards are scheduled, executives 
could try to control the release of information to the capital market in an effort 
to depress the price on the award date" (Erik Lie, 2005). 
Scheduled and unscheduled option grants 
Stock options are usually granted to CEOs once a year. In terms of the timing 
of the grants, academics have categorized option grants as scheduled grants 
and unscheduled grants. Scheduled grants are defined as grants that were 
given on the identical date to the previous year. Unscheduled grants do not 
occur on the same day every year. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) identify a grant 
as a scheduled award when the option award date is the same every year. Erik 
Lie (2005) defines an award to be scheduled if it occurs within one week of the 
one-year anniversary of the prior year's award date and unscheduled if it does 
not or if no options were awarded during the prior year. Narayanan (2005) 
classifies an option grant as scheduled if at least one manager has been 
granted options in the same calendar month the previous year. 
2.2 Prior research 
The explosion of option grants has attracted considerable attention from 
academics. Many academic studies related to such incentive compensation 
have found an interesting pattern of share price return around option grants, 
and cited this as supportive of the CEOs opportunistically timing the option 
grants. 
8 Yermack (1997) and Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) describe the option granting process in great 
detail. 
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2.2.1 Empirical evidence of timing of the option grants date 
The seminal work on the timing of option grants was conducted by David 
Yermack (1997). This study investigated the relationship between the stock 
price and option grants. He examined the stock returns around a sample of 
620 scheduled and unscheduled stock option awards to CEOs of Fortune 500 
companies between 1992 and 1994, focusing on the abnormality of returns 
prior to or after the grant dates. This study finds that the stock returns leading 
up to the award dates are normal, while the stock returns during the 50 trading 
days thereafter exceed those of the market by more than 2%. He interprets 
these results as evidence that executives opportunistically time awards to 
occur before anticipated stock price increases. 
2.2.2 Empirical evidence of timing information disclosures around the 
options award date 
Two subsequent studies by Aboody and Kasznik(2000) and Chauvin and 
Shenoy (2001) resulted in similar findings to Yermack (1997). Aboody and 
Kasznik(2000) investigated a sample of 2,039 scheduled CEO option awards 
by 572 firms between 1992 and 1996, focusing on the changes in the stock 
price relative to the arrival of good or bad news. The investigation of the 
scheduled option grants allowed them to remove the possibility that the results 
are attributable to timing the award date. They find that the abnormal returns 
before scheduled awards are statistically indistinguishable from zero; however 
the abnormal returns during the subsequent 30 days are statistically different 
from zero. Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) examined abnormal stock price 
changes prior to executive option grants. By testing 783 CEO option grants 
between 1981 and 1992, they found a statistically significant abnormal 
decrease in the stock price during the 10-day period immediately preceding 
the executive stock option grants - negative abnormal returns before stock 
18 
option grants, and an upward trend in prices following the grants. They 
interpret these findings to indicate that executives opportunistically time the 
release of information around fixed option awards, thus maximizing their stock 
option compensation. 
2.2.3 Empirical evidence of backdating of stock option grants 
A frequently cited paper by Erik Lie (2005) took these researches one step 
further. From a· S&P ExecuComp database, he collected a large sample of 
5,977 stock option awards to CEOs during the decade of 1992 to 2002, 
examining options that were not granted the same date every year 
(unscheduled). Similar to the earlier studies, Lie also focused on the 
abnormality of returns prior to and after the grant date. He found a strong and 
striking stock return pattern for the unscheduled awards. The average 
abnormal return during the 30 trading days prior to option grants is -3%, most 
of which occurs during the 10 days immediately before the grants. During the 
first 10 days afterward, the average abnormal return is 2%, and almost another 
2% during the next 20 days. He discovered that the stock market as a whole 
also often rose following option grants at certain companies. Based on the 
paper's premise that executives do not possess the ability to forecast future 
market-wide movements, he suggested the ·results as "at least some of the 
option awards are timed retroactively". He was the first to identify another 
questionable way to issue stock options which could be utilized by top 
executives to manipulate the options price-backdating. 
This celebrated study attracted a great deal of attention from both academics 
and regulators, as well as the general public. 
Later academic studies concerning backdating include: Collins, Gong, and Li 
(2005), Heron and Lie (2006a), Narayanan and Seyhun (2005). These studies 
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looked at how the patterns of pre- and post-grant stock returns were influenced 
by the change in regulatory law (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) which now accelerates 
the reporting deadline of executive stock option grants to be within two 
business days after the grants. Collins, Gong, and Li (2005) compare 
abnormal returns around CEO option awards between the pre- and post-SOX 
period. They find the abnormal returns prior to option awards are significantly 
negative in the pre-SOX period, but are not significantly different from zero in 
the post-SOX period. The abnormal returns following option awards are 
significantly positive in both the pre- and post-SOX period, but in the pre-SOX 
period are significantly smaller than those in the post-SOX period. Heron and 
Lie (2006a) show that the pattern of abnormal returns around option grants 
disappeared for the subset of their sample that reported option grants 
immediately, and explains that backdating is the primary source of the average 
abnormal returns around executive option grants. 
Narayanan and Seyhun(2005) use more comprehensive data on option grants 
(the data covers a period of 11 years, contains all option grants made by 
publicly traded firms). They find significant abnormal stock return reversals 
around the grant date. (Abnormal stock return reversals are based on specified 
thresholds for both the pre-grant and post-grant cumulative abnormal returns. 
Should both the cumulative abnormal return for pre-grant and post-grant 
exceed the specified thresholds, an abnormal stock return reversal is qualified.) 
The reversals are more pronounced for unscheduled grants. The extent of 
reversals is positively related to the magnitude of the time interval between the 
grant date and the date the grants are reported to the SEC (reporting lag). The 
study reported the overall average reporting lag was 170 days for its sample of 
option grants, compared to the reporting lag of no more than 40 days where 
there was full compliance, giving a picture of a significant delay in option grant 
reporting. The observation cannot be completely explained by both 
opportunistic timing of information releases by firms and opportunistic timing of 
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grant dates. Thus it provides additional evidence of some firms setting the 
grant date on a backdating basis. 
These later studies confirming the existence of backdating option grants, also 
show that the changes of regulation reduced but did not eliminate the CEOs 
opportunistically timing the option grants. 
2.2.4 Further research re backdating of stock option grants 
Several studies concerning the backdating of stock option grants were 
conducted to estimate the proportion of backdated or manipulated stock option 
grants. 
A Harvard study9 , titled "Lucky CEOs", researched all the at-the-money, 
unscheduled grants awarded to public companies' CEOs during the decade of 
1996-2005. It focuses on the ranking of a grant date's price in the distribution 
of prices during the month of the grant and finds that the excess incidence of 
grants is concentrated at the lowest price of the grant month. The author 
defines this as "lucky grants" - grants given at the lowest price of the month. 
The study estimates 1, 163 lucky grants (50% of all lucky grants) were 
manipulated over the sample period and provides strong evidence that 
backdating has been a major driver of the high incidence of "lucky grants" 
among "old economy" firms as well as high-tech ones. The study of "lucky 
directors", which was conducted by the same author, examined public firms 
that granted options to non-executive directors during 1996 to 2005. It 
estimates 804 lucky grants (32.5% of all lucky grants) were manipulated and 
9 Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein, Urs Peyer, Nov.16, 2006, Luck CEOs. Harvard Law and 
Economics Discussion Paper No. 566. Available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=945392 
(accessed: 15/3/2007) 
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provides evidence that opportunistic timing has not been limited to executive 
grants, but rather has been present in outside directors' grants as well. Heron 
and Lie (2006b) estimate that 13.6% of 39,888 option grants to top executives 
were backdated or manipulated during the sample period of 1996 to 2005, and 
find a relationship between the degree of stock price volatility and frequency of 
backdating. 
2.3 Methods used by prior studies 
All the research studies mentioned above used various event-study 
methodologies to test the stock price performance prior to or after the option 
grant dates. 
Yermack (1997) used a market model to estimate abnormal stock returns 
around the event of option awards. This model estimates the relationship 
between a share's returns and market returns by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression and uses this relationship to estimate expected returns (Re;), given 
returns on the market. The abnormal return (AR) for stock i at time t is: 
AR;t = R;t - Re;= R;t- a;-~; Rmt 
Where the a; and ~; are regression coefficients, Rit and Rmt stand for the stock 
i and market return at time t. 
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) and Narayanan and Seyhun (2005) used the 
same model - the index model, which assumes that over any period t, a share 
i will earn the market rate of return Rmt· thus the abnormal return (AR) is: 
AR;t = Rit - Rmt 
Lie (2005) and his subsequent study, Lie and Heron (2006a), applied the 
I 
three-factor model which was developed by Fama and French from the Capital 
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Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by adding two factors of "size" and "value" to 
estimate the expected return 10. The abnormal return (AR) of share i at time tis 
equal to the difference between the actual return Rit and the predicted return 
ARit = Rit - K;t 
The two Harvard studies, "lucky CEOs" and "lucky directors", provide an 
alternative methodology for studying option timing, that is based on the ranking 
of the grant price within the price distribution for the month. 
2.4 Backdating practice in the U.S 
With a report suggesting executives of six companies might have backdated 
their option grants published by the Wall Street Journal on 18 March 2006, 
backdating became a full-fledged scandal. 11 In the U.S, many investigations 
have been launched by State and Federal regulators an·d 141 companies have 
thus far come under scrutiny12, some companies have undertaken internal 
investigations in addition to responding to SEC investigations. A number of 
companies have publicly acknowledged issues relating to the backdating of 
option grants and dozens of executives and directors have been forced to 
resign. The SEC has filed civil charges against some companies. On 26 June 
2007, Bloomberg news stated that " ... 100 (companies) announced they must 
restate previously reported financial results. So far, the restatements, revisions 
and charges exceed $11 billion. More than 70 executives and directors left 
their jobs and more than 300 lawsuits were filed against more than 100 
10 Fama and French (1993), common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds, Journal of 
Financial Economics. Vol. 33; P3-56 
11 Judith Bums, Dow Jones Newswire, 27 Jan, 2006; Charles Forelle & James Bandler, the 
perfect day, Wall St, J., 18 Mar, 2006 
12 The WSJ maintains an "option Scorecard" at www.wsj.com, with an updated list of all the 
companies that have come under scrutiny in connection with backdating issues, and it counted 141 
such companies as of 25 July 2007. 
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companies. 13" 
For example, On 24 October 2006, the SEC press release stated that the 
commission charged the former chief financial officer of Comverse Technology 
Inc., David Kreinberg and two other former Comverse executives with 
" ...... engaging over many years in a fraudulent scheme to grant undisclosed 
in-the-money options to themselves and to others by backdating stock option 
grants to coincide with historically low closing prices of Comverse common 
stock" 14 · The commission alleged that through the exercise of illegally 
backdated option grants and the subsequent sale of Comverse common stock, 
the former executives collectively realized millions of dollars of ill-gotten 
compensation. The former chairman and CEO Kobi Alexander, realized actual 
gains of nearly $138 million from the sales of stock which he exercised by 
backdating options that were granted during the 1991 through 2002 period. 
Kreinberg realized an actual gain of nearly $13 million from sales of stock 
underlying the exercises of backdated options that were granted during the 
1994 to 2001 period. The former director Sorin realized an actual gain of more 
than $14 million from selling the exercised backdating options that were 
granted during the 1991 to 2001 period. Kreinberg pleaded guilty and was 
required to pay $1,769,255.80, $989,434.00 of which represents the 
"in-the-money" benefit from exercises of backdated option grants. 15 The 
former CEO Alexander has fled the U.S to avoid prosecution.16 
13 Blooberg news: Vernon Wessels, Ex-Comverse chief Alexander says backdating 'is not illegal', 
26 June 2007, 16:56 EDT. Available at: Http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=a3WV qRvbeSoo (Accessed: 07 /08/2007) 
14 SEC Press Release: David Kreinberg, Former CFO of Comverse Technology, Inc., Agrees to 
Settle SEC Charges in Options Backdating Case; 2006-180; 24 October 2006; see also SEC 
Charges Former Comverse Technology, Inc., CEO, CFO, and General Counsel in Stock Option 
Backdating Scheme; 2006-137; 9 August 2006 
15 Id. 
16 Charles Forelle, Stock Options Criminal Charge: Slush Fund and Fake Employee, Wall Street 
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On 14 February 2007, the SEC announced a $6.3million settlement with the 
former Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of video and 
computer game publisher and distributor Take-Two Interactive Software Inc. 
(Take-Two), Ryan Ashley Brant, concerning stock option backdating. The 
commission alleged that "during a seven year period, Brant enriched himself 
and others by granting undisclosed, in-the-money stock options to himself and 
to other Take-Two officers and employees ...... resulting in millions of dollars of 
ill gotten gains and materially misrepresenting its financial condition to 
investors."17 In this civil charge, Brant pleaded guilty to felony criminal charges 
of Falsifying Business Records in the First Degree and agreed to pay $1 
million in lieu of fines and forfeiture. 
On 6 February 2007, the SEC filed civil actions against the former Chief 
Financial Officer Gary C. Gerhardt and the former Controller Steven J. 
Landmann of Engineered Support Systems, Inc. The commission alleged that 
from 1997 through 2002, they backdated stock option grants to coincide with 
historically low closing prices of Engineered Support's common stock. As a 
result of the backdating, top executives and directors received approximately 
$15 million unauthorized compensation, Gerhardt and Landmann personally 
profited by $1,906,300 and $518,972 respectively. 18 
Moreover, Mercury fired its former CEO and CFO after an investigation turned 
up 49 instances of backdating; 19 Apple Computer Inc. made an 
Journal, 10 Aug. 2006 
17 SEC Press Release: SEC Announces $6.3 Million Settlement With Former Take-Two 
Interactive Software, Inc., CEO in Stock Option Backdating Scheme; 2007-20; 14 February 2007 
18 SEC Press Release: SEC Files Actions · against Former CFO and Former Controller of 
Engineered Support Systems, Inc., Relating to Options Backdating Scheme; 2007-15; 6 Feb. 2007. 
19 Burrows Peter, In the valley, Scars that could last a long time, Business Week, 10/30/2006 Issue 
4007, p82-82, l/7p, le 
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announcement that it had uncovered 15 instances of possible stock-options 
backdating between 1997 and 2002.20 The CEO of giant insurance company 
United-Health Group has resigned from the company after a report suggested 
that he benefited from backdating.21 The former CEO of Brocade Systems, a 
computer hardware company, was charged with backdating practice by the 
U.S attorney.22 
An academic study using a sample of firms that had already been implicated in 
backdating found that backdating resulted in an average loss to shareholders 
of about 7% ($400 million per firm). The average potential gain from 
backdating to all executives in these firms is about $500,000 per firm 
annually.23 
2.5 Stock options in South Africa 
Stock options in South Africa tend to follow international trends which have 
developed in world economies, particularly North America and Europe, as 
these represent the country's major trading partners. A survey conducted by 
Bussin and May in 2001, aimed to examine the application and the extent to 
which share options are being used as long-term incentives in South Africa. Of 
300 canvassed private and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange listed 
companies, employing over 1000 employees, 84 usable responses were 
obtained. 89% of the respondents used share options at executive level. 
According to Towers Perrin (2001 ), of all the share incentive schemes in 
operation in South Africa, almost 80% will include share options. Sacha (2003) 
20 Harris Roy, Former Apple CFO Bitten by Backdating? CFO, Nov 2006, Vol. 22 Issue 12, 
p108-108, 2/3p 
21 Walking the plank, Economist, 10/21 /2006, Vol. 381 Issue 8500, p73-74, 2p, 1 c 
22 SEC Litigation release No.19768, SEC v, Reyes, et al., civil action No. C-06-4435 
23 M.P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani and H. Nejat Seyhun, the Economc Impact of Backdating 
of Executive Stock Options, working paper, 2006, P2 
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states that of the share incentive schemes observed in South Africa, 73% use 
share option schemes. 
A research study into South African executive pay, as cited in Business Day 
{South Africa), established that company bosses on average earned R4,654 a 
day. If stock options exercised were included, the figure increased to R12,518 
a day. The top 10 earning CEOs' average salary was R32,794 a day, and if 
stock options exercised were included this figure further increased to R91,972 
a day. By far, stock options are the greatest boost for CEOs' remuneration. 24 
Sacho (2003) illustrates several types of share option plans in South Africa, 
and lists the following salient features of typical share option grants: 
• Discounted share options. The King Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa recommends specific approval by shareholders for the 
allocations of share options at discounts (King Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa 2002, para:6.4). Following this 
recommendation, some companies have reported recent share options 
were issued at exercise prices of 10% to 20% below the market price of 
the underlying shares. Certain companies set the option exercise prices at 
the average market price of the underlying shares for the 5 or 30 trading 
days prior to the grant date. 
• The eligibility for share option grants in South Africa has been extended to 
directors and senior managers. The granting of share options is at the 
discretion of senior management, although the King Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa recommends that a remuneration committee 
be appointed consisting mainly of independent non-executive directors, to 
make recommendations to the board in respect of remuneration packages 
24 Study claims yawning worker-CEO pay gap, Business Day (South Africa), 20 July 2006, 
Labour, Pg. 2 
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for executive directors. (King Report on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa 2002, para:5.1 &5.2) 
Despite the popularity of stock options for senior management remuneration in 
South Africa, there are limited studies concerning the timing of options grants. 
For the purpose of this paper - to investigate whether South African listed 
companies were opportunistically timing executive stock option grants, three 
databases have been used to establish whether any similar research has been 
done in South Africa. The three databases are: 
1 . SA ePublications database. SA ePublications is South Africa's premier 
facilitator of access to online information. It includes 350 South African 
publications and provides full text links from the indexed articles to the PDF 
files of the articles. The database has a sophisticated search engine and 
integrates with SA Citations. It includes abstracts of periodicals published in 
South Africa, important scientific and technical journals, some general and 
popular magazines, all published over the past 15 years. 
2. Current and Completed Research database. Current and Completed 
Research Projects contains South African research projects and covers the 
social sciences, humanities, economic and management sciences. It includes 
masters and doctoral theses of South African universities, and technikons as 
well as information on research projects from non-governmental organizations, 
private sector and government departments. All non-English titles of projects 
are translated into English. It is updated monthly and the coverage is from 
1950. 
3. The Union Catalogue for Thesis and Dissertations (UCTD) database. The 
UCTD contains bibliographic records of theses and dissertations at master and 
doctorate level submitted to universities in South Africa. Honorary doctorates 
are also included. It is updated annually and the coverage is from 1918. 
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Using the above three databases, any element of the subset of "stock options 
or share options or executive remuneration" elicits responses; any element of 
the subset of "timing or manipulating or backdating", likewise, has responses. 
However, when combining any combination of elements from the two subsets, 
there is a null response. 
The absence of reports concerning timing stock option grants in South Africa 
indicates that a study on the JSE listed firms will not only be interesting from a 
South African perspective, but also will serve as a comparison between 
emerging and mature markets. 
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Chapter III Accounting and tax treatment of share options 
It is not the intention to give a comprehensive accounting and tax synopsis of 
share options, as this is not the focus of this study. Below is a very brief 
summary of the accounting treatment and tax implications of share options in 
the USA and South Africa. 
3.1 Accounting treatment of share options 
3.1.1 Accounting treatment of share options in the U.S 
In the United States, until 15 June 2005, the accounting treatment of share 
options was determined by the guidelines of the Accounting Principles Board 
Opinion No. 25 - Accounting for Stock (APB 25), and the Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No.123 - Accounting for Stock-Based 
Compensation (SFAS 123). For financial years beginning after 15 June 2005, 
the accounting treatment of share options follows the rules of the Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (revised 2004) - Share-Based 
Payment (SFAS 123R).25 
Under APB 25, options that were granted at-the-money or out-of-the-money 
had no impact at all on any of the financial statements. If options were granted 
in-the-money, the difference between the share price at grant date and the 
exercise price (called the intrinsic value of the option) had to be treated as an 
expense and deducted from income. The intrinsic value (aggregated over all 
option grants) was amortized, as a compensation expense, evenly over the 
25 FASB statement No 123R is effective for public entities that do not file as small business 
issuers as of the beginning of the first interim or annual reporting period that begins after 15 June 
2005; for public entities that file as small business issuers as of the beginning of the first interim or 
annual reporting period that begins after 15 December 2005; and for nonpublic entities as of the 
beginning of the first annual reporting period that begins after 15 December 2005. 
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vesting period. (Narayanan, 2006; APB 25, Oct.1972) 
SFAS 123 encouraged companies to adopt a fair value based method of 
accounting for employee stock options. Under the fair value based method, the 
compensation cost is measured at the grant date based on the value of the 
awards and is recognized over the vesting period. However, it also allowed 
companies to measure compensation costs for share options using the 
intrinsic value based method of accounting prescribed by APB 25. Companies 
electing the APB 25 rules were required to make pro forma disclosures 
showing the effect on earnings if SFAS 123 had been adopted. 
In December 2004, the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
released the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (revised 
2004) - Share-Based Payment (SFAS 123R). This statement supersedes both 
SFAS 123 and APB Opinion No 25. It is effective in the United States for 
financial years starting after 15 June 2005 26 . In terms of SFAS 123R, 
companies are required to apply a fair-value based measurement method for 
share-based . payment transactions with employees and to record the 
compensation expense for all awards granted at the time of the grant. SFAS 
123R also applies to awards modified, repurchased or cancelled after the 
required effective date. In addition, companies are required to record the 
compensation expense (as previous awards subsequently vest) for the 
unvested portion of previously granted awards that remain outstanding at the 
date of adoption. 
3.1.2 Accounting treatment of share options in South Africa 
The current accounting treatment of share options in South Africa is governed 
26 For non-public entities and public entities that file as small business issuers, it is effective for 
fiscal years beginning after 15 December 2005 
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by International Financial Reporting Standard 2 - Share-Based Payment 
(IFRS 2), which is published by the International Accounting Standards Board. 
In terms of IFRS 2, share options granted to employees are required to be fair 
valued at the grant date using an option pricing model and charged through the 
income statement over the options vesting period - the period of time before 
the optionee has an unconditional right to the shares. The overall approach is 
broadly similar to FASB Statement No.123. Expensing of employee share 
options only became mandatory in South Africa for financial periods beginning 
on or after 1 January 2005. But for options granted after 7 November 2002 
which had not vested before the introduction of IFRS 2 (1 January 2005), the 
Standard is applicable. 
Before IFRS 2 became effective in South Africa, share options were accounted 
for in terms of the guidelines of AC 116 - Employee Benefits, which was based 
on its international equivalent, IAS 19 - Employee benefits (SAICA,2000: 
paragraphs 148-149). In terms of AC 116 and IAS 19, companies were 
required to disclose share option plan details, exercise prices and other share 
option information. The disclosure requirements were expanded by section 
297(2A)(g) of the Companies Act No.61, 1973 and the King Report on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa. 
Although South African companies did not recognize ESOs as an expense in 
their financial statements prior to 1 January 2005, the South African accounting 
profession had previously adopted a disclosure model for ESOs, rather than a 
recognition model. (Sacha, .2003) 
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3.2 Tax treatment of share options 
3.2.1 Tax treatment of share options in the U.S 
Sacho (2003) discusses the basic types of share option plans and the relevant 
tax treatment of each share option plan in the United States. He states that two 
types of share option plans are available in the U.S - Incentive Stock Options 
(ISO) and Nonqualified Stock Options (NQSO). In practice, ISO grants are 
generally limited to senior executives. ISO and NQSO are subject to sections 
422 and 83 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) respectively, thus having 
different tax implications. 
In respect of the ISO plan, the employee receiving an ISO, recognizes no 
taxable income upon the ISO's grant. In the event of the grant, vesting or 
exercise of an ISO, there are no tax effects for the optionee. However, there 
will be tax implications for the employee upon the ultimate sale of the shares. 
Two tax consequences arise from the disposal of option-exercised shares, 
depending on whether or not the shares were disposed of in a qualifying or 
disqualifying disposition27 . Qualifying dispositions treat the entire gain (the 
difference between the option exercise price and the sales proceeds) as a 
capital gain taxed at the favorable capital gains tax rate as opposed to the 
higher tax rate for income of a revenue nature. For disqualifying dispositions, 
the difference between the option exercise price and the fair market value of 
the shares at the time of option exercise is subject to ordinary income tax in the 
tax year that the options are exercised, and the difference between the fair 
market value of the shares on the exercise date and the disposition proceeds 
27 A qualifying disposition occurs if the shares are sold after the completion of the requisite ISO 
statutory holding period. A disqualifying disposition occurs if the shares are sold within the 
requisite statutory holding period. The ISO statutory holding period is the later of two years from 
the date of the granting of the ISO to the employee or one year from the date that the shares were 
transferred to the employee upon exercise of his share options. 
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upon the sale of the shares is treated as a capital gain for tax purposes in the 
tax year that the shares are sold. 
From the employer's perspective, the company granting an ISO is not entitled 
to a tax deduction with respect to the issuance of the option or its exercise. The 
amount received by the company, at the exercise price, will be considered to 
be the amount received by the employer for the transfer of the ISO shares. 
However, the general management and administration expenses associated 
with the share option may be deductible. 
For the NQSOs, there is normally no tax event arising from the employee 
receiving an NQSO at grant date as the non-publicly traded ESOs do not have 
a "readily ascertainable market value at grant date"28. If there is a readily 
determinable fair market value, the appreciation in the value of the shares is 
treated as income of a revenue nature in the hands of the employee for tax 
purposes. Usually, the IRC takes a wait-and-see approach towards NQSOs 
and defers the tax events until the options are exercised. When the options are 
exercised, the difference between the market value of the share and the strike 
price is subject to ordinary income tax in the employee's hands, and the 
employer may be entitled to a corporate tax deduction at the exercise date 
equivalent to the amount of the income recognized by the employee. These 
rules apply to NQSOs regardless of whether they are in-the-money, 
at-the-money, or out-the-money. Any additional gain made by the employee as 
a result of the subsequent sale of the option-exercised shares is treated as a 
capital gain subject to taxation at capital gains tax rates. There will be no tax 
consequences for NQSOs in terms of Section 83, even if the options were 
backdated. 
In addition, section 162(m) of the IRC limits the executive compensation 
28 Sacho, 2003, Accounting for employee share options: A critical analysis. P 40 
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deduction for public companies to $1 million per year per executive for 
compensation paid to the top five most highly-compensated executive officers 
for proxy reporting purposes. Option compensation that satisfies certain 
criteria may be considered "performance-based compensation" and would be 
excluded from the $1 million limit.29 (Narayanan, 2006) 
3.2.2 Tax treatment of share options in South Africa 
The tax legislation relevant to share options in South Africa is contained in the 
Income Tax Act No 5B, 1962 (the Act). The relevant provisions pertaining to 
share options, from an employee's (optionee's) tax perspective, are section BA, 
section B8 and section BC and the Eighth Schedule to the Act. Share options 
granted before 26 October 2004 are subject to section BA, whereas section BC 
applies to share options granted on or after this date. Section B8 deals with the 
taxation of equity instruments, including share options, issued to employees in 
terms of broad-based share plans30• 
Prior to the introduction of section BC, share option schemes were often 
structured to minimize the tax effect for employees by converting gains of a 
revenue nature (taxable at a rate of 40%31 ) to gains of a capital nature. This 
resulted in a tax-free gain for the employee prior to the introduction of capital 
gains tax on 1 October 2001, and capital gains tax at a rate of 10% 32 
thereafter. Section BC was introduced in an attempt to eliminate this 
29 Option compensation will be considered "performance-based compensation" when the options 
are granted under a plan that has a per-person per-period limit on the number of options that can 
be granted each year; the options are not in-the-money when granted; an independent 
compensation committee grants the options; and there is shareholder approval of the plan. (IRC 
section 162(m)) 
30 As broad-based share plans are beyond the scope of this study, the tax treatment of equity 
instruments subject to section 8B of the Act is omitted. 
31 Assuming the maximum marginal income tax rate for individuals at 26 October 2004. 
32 Assuming the maximum marginal income tax rate for individuals at 26 October 2004. 
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opportunity for tax planning. 
In terms of section BA of the Act, there is no tax effect in the event of the 
granting and vesting of options. However, tax consequences arise upon the 
exercise, cession or release of options. The revenue gain, being the difference 
between the market value of the shares at the date that the option is exercised, 
ceded or released and any consideration paid by the employee for the share 
options and the underlying shares, is fully taxable in the employee's hands and 
is subject to income tax. Section BA contains no provision for the deduction of 
losses, as an option would not be exercised if it is out-of-the-money. Where the 
option-exercised shares are subject to a restriction and cannot be disposed of 
for a specified period of time, section BA( 1 )(b) provides that the taxpayer may 
elect to defer the taxable gain upon the exercise of the options until the tax 
year in which the taxpayer is entitled to dispose of the shares. 
Section BC deals with the taxation on the vesting of equity instruments, which 
includes shares and options to acquire shares, granted on or after 26 October 
2004. Section BC focuses on when an equity instrument vests rather than on 
when the share option is exercised. The gains or losses that arise pursuant to 
the vesting of options will be included in, or deducted from, the optionee's 
taxable income, irrespective of whether or not the option is exercised. The gain 
or loss to be included in, or deducted from, the taxpayer's income is the 
difference between the market value when the equity instrument vests and any 
consideration paid in respect of the equity instrument33. 
Section BC further differentiates between restricted 34 and unrestricted 35 
33 The disposal of convertible financial instruments, equity instruments to connected persons and 
non-arms length transactions have been ignored for the purposes of this paper. 
34 Section 8C (7) defines a "restricted equity instrument" as an equity instrument: 
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equity instruments. For equity instruments that are subject to restrictions, such 
as a time period during which the employee must remain employed by the 
company to obtain the options, or for example where performance targets must 
be achieved to exercise the options, section 10(1 )(nD) exempts from income 
tax the receipt or accrual of any equity instrument which has not vested. For 
tax purposes, the vesting of restricted equity instruments takes place at the 
earliest of the lapsing of all restrictions in relation to the equity instrument36, the 
disposal of the equity instrument, the termination of the option, and the 
taxpayer's death. Unrestricted equity instruments vest at the time of granting. 
Therefore, where one restricted equity instrument (an option) is disposed of for 
another restricted equity instrument (a share), the former equity instrument will 
not vest. It must be noted that section 8C will not apply to the option-exercised 
shares if the options were already subject to this section of the Act. 
The capital gains tax implications for share options and any underlying shares 
are contained in the Eighth Schedule to the Act. A capital gain or loss may 
arise upon the disposal of an asset, which includes the termination or exercise 
which is subject to any restriction that prevents the taxpayer from freely disposing of it at 
market value; 
which is subject to any restriction that could result in the owner forfeiting ownership or the 
right to acquire ownership other than at market value; 
where any person has retained the right to impose the abovementioned restrictions on the 
disposal of the instrument; 
which is an option to acquire a restricted equity instrument; 
which is a convertible financial instrument that can be converted to a restricted equity 
instrument; 
where the employer or any other person, by arrangement with the employer, has undertaken 
to cancel the transaction or repurchase the equity instrument at a price exceeding its market 
value, if there is a decline in the value of the instrument; or 
which is not delivered to the taxpayer until the occurrence of an event 
35 An "unrestricted equity instrument" is any equity instrument which is not a restricted equity 
instrument. 
36 In relation to a share option, this includes any restrictions on the option and the underlying 
shares. 
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of an option and the sale of shares.37 The capital gain or loss will be the 
difference between the proceeds from the disposal and the base cost of the 
assets.38 All capital gains and losses for the relevant year of assessment are 
aggregated. If there is a net capital gain for the year, 25% of that gain is 
included in the employee's taxable income in terms of section 26A of the Act. 
On the contrary, if a net capital loss arises, that loss does not reduce taxable 
income but is carried forward to the following year of assessment to be 
aggregated with any capital gains and losses in that year. 
When an option terminates without being exercised and no proceeds are 
received or accrued, it results in a capital loss equivalent to any consideration 
paid for the options. In addition, the disposal of an equity instrument before 
vesting, as contemplated in section BC to the Act, is ignored for capital gains 
tax purposes. Similarly, the exchange of an option contemplated in section BA 
of the Act for another such right, is ignored for capital gains tax purposes. 
Furthermore, paragraph 5B of the Eighth Schedule to the Act provides that any 
capital gain or loss resulting from the exercise of an option must be 
disregarded. Where a share option is exercised, the cost of the option (or its 
market value at 1 October 2001, in the case of an option acquired prior to that 
date) is included in the base cost of the underlying shares.39 
The ultimate disposal of option-exercised shares may result in either a capital 
or a revenue gain, depending on the executive's intention for acquiring the 
shares. Generally, the underlying shares are acquired for capital purposes and 
any gain or loss arising (after 1 October 2001) from the sale of these shares 
will be of a capital nature. For the disposal of option-exercised shares where 
37 Paragraphs 1 and 11 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act 
38 Paragraph 2 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act 
39 Paragraphs 20 (I) (c) (ix), 20 (I) (f) and 58 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
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the options were subject to section BA, the base cost of the underlying shares 
will be the market value of the shares at the date the options were exercised.40 
Where the options were subject to section BC, the base cost of the shares will 
be the market value of the shares at the date that the shares vested.41 
The table below summarizes the tax implications under section BA and section 
BC in respect of share options. 




Unrestricted Restriction on 
options options only 
Option No tax effects There is no No tax effects 
grant distinction between 
the granting and 
Option No tax effects vesting of the option. The gain or loss 
vesting (as The gain or loss arising from the 
per the arising from the difference between 
terms of difference between the market value of 
share the market value of the option at the 
option the option at the time time that it vests in 
!dienie) it is granted and the the optionee and the 
consideration paid consideration paid 
for the option will be for the option will 
included in, or be included in, or 
deducted from, the deducted from, the 
optionee's taxable optionee's taxable 
income, which will income, which will 
be subject to be subject to 
ordinary income tax. ordinary income tax 
40 Paragraphs 20 (I) (h) (i) and 20 (2) (c) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act 
41 Paragraph 20 (I) (h) (i) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act. 
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Restriction on 
both options & 
shares or only 
on the shares 
No tax effects 
No tax effects 




Unrestricted Restriction on Restriction on 
options options only both options & 
shares or only 
on the shares 
Option Optionee pays No tax effects No tax effects No tax effects 
exercise ordinary income tax 
on the difference 
between the market 
value of the shares 
at the time of 
exercise and the 
consideration paid 
for the shares and 
share options42• 
Lapse of No tax effects43 No tax effects No tax effects The difference 
restriction between the 
s on the market value of 
shares the shares at the 
date the 
restrictions 
lapse, and any 
consideration 
paid for the 
options and 
shares will be 




which will be 
subject to 
income tax. 
42 For the option-exercised shares which are subject to a restriction, in that the optionee cannot 
dispose of the shares for a specific time period, the taxpayer may elect to defer the tax liability 
upon the exercise of the options and include the liability in the tax year in which the restriction 
lapses and he is entitled to dispose the shares. 
43 Income tax consequence arises if the optionee elects to defer the taxable gain upon the exercise 
of the options. 
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Unrestricted Restriction on Restriction on 
options options only both options & 
shares or only 
on the shares 
Sale of The difference The difference The difference The difference 
shares between the sale between the sale between the sale between the sale 
(assuming proceeds and base proceeds and base proceeds and base proceeds and the 
shares are cost of the shares is cost of the shares is cost of the shares is base cost of the 
of a treated as a capital treated as a capital treated as a capital shares is treated 
capital gain and taxed gain and taxed gain and taxed as a capital gain 
nature) accordingly. The accordingly. The accordingly. The and taxed 
base cost of the base cost of the base cost of the accordingly. The 
shares will be the shares will be the shares will be the base cost of the 
market value of the market value of the market value of the shares will be 
shares at the shares at the option shares at the date the market value 
exercise date. grant date. that the restrictions of the shares at 
on the options lapse. the date that the 
restrictions on 
the shares lapse. 
The example below illustrates the different tax consequences of share options 
under section 8A and section BC. 
In October 2004, employee A is granted an option to acquire 1,000 shares at 
R1 O each. The market value of the shares is R15 per share at that date and A 
pays R500 for the option. The option is subject to a restriction and is not 
exercisable until 30 October 2005, when the market value of the shares is R20 
per share. On 30 October 2006, the market value of the shares is R30 per 
share and A exercises his option. However, A is not allowed to sell the 
option-exercised shares for three years from exercise date. On 30 October 
2009, when the restriction lapses, the company's shares are trading at R50 per 
share. One year later (on 30 October 2010), A sells all his shares for R60, 000. 
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Event Section SA Section SC 
Grant of option No tax effect. Not taxed as the option is subject to a 
(20 October 2004 restriction and has not vested. The 
for section 8A; 30 acquisition of an option that has not 
October 2004 for vested is exempt from income tax in 
section 8C) terms of section lO(l)(nD) of the Act 
Lapse of No tax effect. No tax effect as the option has not 
restriction on vested due to the underlying shares 
option (30 October being restricted 
2005) 
Exercise of option R19,500 [(R30xlOOO)-(R10 x No tax effect as the shares have not 
(30 October 2006) 1000) - R500] will be included vested (the shares are still subject to a 
in A's gross income and will be restriction) 
subject to ordinary income tax. 
Alternatively, A may elect to 
defer this tax liability until the 
restriction on the shares has 
lapsed. 
Lapse of No tax effect R39,500 [(R50xlOOO)-(R10xlOOO) 
restriction on - R500]will be included in A's gross 
shares (30 October income and will be subject to 
2009) ordinary income tax 
Sale of shares (30 R30,000 [(R60x 1 OOO)-(R30x Rl0,000[(R60x1000)-(RSOx 1000)] 
October 2010)- 1000)] will be subject to capital will be subject to capital gains tax. 
assuming the gain tax 
shares are of a 
capital nature 
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Chapter N Methodology 
4.1 Event study methodologies 
Previous research into the timing of stock option grants has used various event 
study methodologies to estimate the abnormal return, prior to or after the 
option grant dates. Bowman (1983) documents that the event study is an 
important methodological approach to market based empirical research in 
finance and accounting. It involves the analysis of stock price behavior 
around the time of the event and has been used to study a variety of events 
such as rights issues (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992), stock splits (Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen and Roll, 1969), the announcements of annual accounting earnings 
(Ball and Brown, 1968), as well as share option grants (Yermack, 1997; Erik 
Lie, 2005; Narayanan, 2006). 
One concern in event studies has been to estimate abnormal returns for a 
given security in any time period. Abnormal return is defined as the actual 
return minus the expected return without conditioning on the event taking place. 
There are various methods given in event study literature to generate the 
expected return of a security, as well as methodological adaptations. "Event 
study methods are worth reviewing because of their many variations and their 
very wide application in empirical research". (Armitage, 1995) 
Brown and Warne (1980) examine various methodologies which are used in 
event studies and generalize three methods to measure security abnormal 
performance, namely mean adjusted return, market adjusted return and 
market and risk adjusted return. 
Bowman (1983) identifies four basic types of event studies (Information 
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content, Market efficiency, Model evaluation and Metric explanation) and 
provides a structure for the conducting of an event study. He classifies those 
commonly considered methods of estimating excess abnormal return as 
unadjusted or mean adjusted returns, risk adjusted returns and risk controlled 
portfolio returns. 
Armitage (1995) outlines various widely used methods of estimating abnormal 
returns and testing their significance, highlights respects in which they differ 
conceptually, and reviews research comparing results they produce in various 
empirical contexts. His paper indicates four main models being the average 
return model, the index model, the market model and the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM). 
Below is a discussion of the four models which are mainly used in events 
study. 
1. Average return model. This model is also known as the mean adjusted 
return model (Brown and Warne, 1980; Bowman, 1983). It assumes that a 
share i will earn the same return as it does on average during an estimation 
period t before or around the test period, i.e. it defines the expected return 
as the mean of the share returns. Then the abnormal return, ARit, is the 
actual return of the share, Rit minus the mean return, r;. 
ARit= R;r r; 
This model has been used by Masulis (1980) to investigate the share price 
response to announcements of changes in gearing. 
A strong support for using the simple mean adjusted return is by Brown and 
Warner (1980, 1985). This paper finds that the mean adjusted returns measure 
was very robust and under many conditions performed as well or better than 
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the more sophisticated methods. However, Brown and Warner's work also 
indicates that the mean adjusted returns model performs badly when event 
dates are the same. Bowman (1983) states that the average return method 
" ... seem crude compared to the elaborate and intricate methods which have 
developed during the past decade." Grinold and Kahn(2000) point out two 
problems in using the average return model to estimate expected return: " First, 
the historical returns contain a large amount of sample error. Second, the 
universe of stocks changes over time ... the stocks themselves change over 
time". Klein and Rosenfeld (1987) show that the average return model 
produces upwardly biased abnormal returns during a bull market and 
downwardly biased abnormal returns during a bear market. 
It is considered that the JSE which is heavily dependant on commodity 
performance has long experienced a bull market in the last three to four years 
due to the increase in the price of commodities. In addition, the event dates 
(option granting date) of this study vary over time. It will not be appropriate to 
employ the average return model in this study following the issues and 
debates addressed above. 
2. Market model. Brown and Warne (1980) consider this model as the market 
and risk adjusted return model while Bowman (1983) considers it as a risk 
adjusted returns model. Bowman (1983) indicates that most of the risk 
adjustment methodologies were developed from the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM). The most common is the market model where the 
systematic risk parameter (beta) is equal to the slope coefficient in a time 
series regression of individual security return$ on the return of a market 
index. Possibly this is why Armitage (1995) regards this approach as the 
market model. 
The market model estimates the relationship between the returns of a 
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security and the market by ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. One of 
the most popular formulations is: 
R;r = O; +J3; Rmr + E;r 
Where: Rir = return on share i over a estimation period T. Usually, T is 
the one year past period 
a; and J3; = regression coefficients for share i 
Rmr = return on the market portfolio in historical period T 
E;r = disturbance term (residual) 
This relationship is used to estimate the expected returns of security i by 
inserting the estimated values of ai and J3; together with the actual return 
on the market. The excess return (AR;r) is the difference between the actual 
return (Rit) and the expected return (eit) in the estimation period t 
ARit = Rit -eit = Rit - (a; +J3; Rmt) 
It must be noted, unlike the "T" in the first equation, 't" here is the future 
period. 
Since the expected value of the residuals is zero, any non-zero value of the 
residuals is termed the abnormal return. 
This model was used by Fama (1969) to examine the abnormal returns 
around the announcement of stock splits. Yermack (1997) used the market 
model to estimate abnormal returns around the event of option awards. 
The market model represents a potential improvement over the average return 
model. It removes the portion of the return which is related to the variation in 
the market's return, thus it increases ability to detect event effects. Armitage 
(1995) indicates that the market model is the most reliable and commonly used 
to generate expected returns in event study. 
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However, "The benefit from using the market model will depend upon the R2 of 
the market model regression. The higher the R2 the greater is the variance 
reduction of the abnormal return, the larger is the gain." (Mackinlay, 1997). 
Coutts, Mills and Roberts (1994) find that "the standard assumptions 
underlying the specification of the market model are invalid, the least squares 
is an inappropriate estimation technique for the market model and the method 
of prediction that forms the basis of calculating abnormal returns is seriously 
undermined since the parameters of the model are inherently unstable". 
Studies (Dimson and March, 1984; Coutts, Mills and Roberts, 1994) doubt the 
applicability and validity of this method with issues inherent in the market 
model. 
~ The issue of residuals 
Dim son and March ( 1984) state that "For stocks which performed well (poorly) 
during the estimation period, a will be projected to be positive (negative) and 
since favorable (unfavorable) performance does not persist in weak-form 
efficient markets ... , the abnormal return can be predicted to be negative 
(positive). The market model would thus provide a quite inappropriate 
benchmark." This statement indicates that the market model residuals would 
exhibit autocorrelation. Brown and Warner (1985) examine daily stock returns 
and find small negative first order autocorrelation in market model residuals. 
Jacobs and Levy (1988) found statistically significant residual reversal. Coutts 
Mills and Roberts (1994) conclude that "the residuals from least squares 
estimation exhibit autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and non-normality, with 
occasional evidence of nonlinearity". 
~ Issue of estimation of parameters. 
Use of the market model requires an estimation of parameters, a and ~. for a 
security relative to the market which it is part of, and it is essential that when 
estimated the parameters of the model are stable over the estimation and 
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event periods. A study concludes that neither portfolio beta nor the betas of 
individual securities exhibit stability over time. (Gregory-Allen, Impson and 
Karafiath, 1994). Coutts (1994) indicates that beta is inherently unstable. 
The estimation period of betas can be very arbitrary and betas are subject to 
fluctuation. Different researchers may arrive at different betas due to the 
method of calculation employed, the number of past observations, the 
frequency of data used, and other assumptions that have to be made. Thin 
trading also cause bias in beta estimates. It has been found that there is a 
weak relationship between beta and actual returns. In addition, there is a 
trade-off between greater precision of estimation of a and ~ and these 
coefficients becoming more 'out of date' when lengthening the estimation 
period. 
"The inherent instability of market model parameters questions the validity of 
this model of research." (Coutts, 1994) 
3. The Capital Asset Pricing model (CAPM). The CAPM is a true theoretical 
model, resulting from a number of simplifying assumptions. The model is 
E(Rit) =Rtt +~i [E(Rmt)-Rtt] 
Where E(Rit) is the expected or normal return on share i for time t, Rrt is 
some measure of 'the risk-free rate of interest', E(Rmt)is some measure 
of the expected return on the appropriate stock market and {3; is the 
covariance of Rit with Rmt over some estimation period (cov[Rit ,RmtD 
divided by the variance of Rmt over that period (s2[RmtD 
The CAPM states that the expected residual on any stock or portfolio is 
zero, the expected returns on the stock (portfolio) is determined entirely by 
the expected excess return on the market and the stock (portfolio)'s beta. 
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Armitage (1995) indicates that the market model can be viewed as a 
version of the CAPM by interpreting ai as an estimate of Rtt ( 1- J3i ). The 
formula for f3i.. cov[Rit ,Rmt] I s2(Rm1), is exactly the same as that required by 
the CAPM. 
Two variants of the CAPM were developed by Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
and Fama and French (1993), known as the Fama-MacBeth model and the 
three factor model. Both of them have been used in event studies. The 
Fama-MacBeth model estimates the expected returns on a share for a 
given time t by: 
E(Rit) =au +a21 J3i t 
Where a11 and a21 are cross-sectional regression coefficients for time t of 
returns against beta and J3i 1 is the actual beta of share i at time t. 
The three factor model describes the expected return on a security by 
adding two factors, called "size" and "value" to CAPM. 
E(Rit) =Rtt +J3i [E(Rmi)-Rtt] + J3st xSMB 1+ J3vt x HML1 
Where SMB stands for "small [cap] minus big", it is the difference between 
the average returns on small stock portfolio (usually the smallest 30% of 
stocks) and big stock portfolio (usually the largest 30% of stocks) in a time 
period t; HML stands for "high [book/price] minus low", it is the difference 
between the average returns on the 50% of shares with the highest book 
value to market value ratio and the 50% of shares with the lowest book 
value to market value ratio in period t. J3i.J3s1 andJ3vt are coefficients. J3i is 
analogous to the beta in the CAPM, but not equal to it, J3s1 andJ3v1 measure 
the level of exposure to size risk and value risk, respectively. 
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This model has been used by Erik Lie (2005, 2006a) to estimate abnormal 
returns around option awards. 
The CAPM generates the expected return, and heavily depends on the 
estimation of beta. As stated above, beta is inherently unstable and the 
multitude of procedures of beta estimation make beta arbitrary and subject to 
fluctuation. Generally, the CAPM is used to test investment rules and fund 
performance, which are not strictly event studies. A PriceWaterhouseCooper 
survey of the South African investment profession found that the CAPM is by 
far the most dominant method used in practice to determine a company's cost 
of equity. 
In testing the detection of abnormal returns using the market model compared 
with other models, studies by both Brenner (1979) and Brick, Statman and 
Weaver (1989) report statistically significant differences between results of 
using the market model and the CAPM. Brenner (1979) reports a small but 
statistically significant difference between the market and Fama-MacBeth 
models. 
The three factor model is motivated by the benefits of reducing the variance of 
the abnormal return by adding more variations (size and value) in the normal 
return. It implicitly assumes that the expected return is directly related to the 
market value of equity. Mackinlay (1997) indicates that the gains from 
employing such multifactor models for event studies are limited, owing to the 
small marginal explanatory power of the additional factors, hence there is little 
reduction in the variance of the abnormal return. Brown and Warne (1980) 
conclude that "beyond a simple, one factor market model, there is no evidence 
that more complicated methodologies convey any benefit." Adding more 
factors to the market model would require more parameters of arbitrary 
estimation. 
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4. Index model. The index model, which Brown (1980) regards as the market 
adjusted returns model, assumes that a share i will earn the same rate of 
return of the market (Rmt) which it is part of over any period t. Thus the 
abnormal return, ARif, is the actual return of the share, Rit, less Rmt,. 
ARit = Rn- Rmt 
The index model has been used by Lakonishok and Vermaelen(1990) to 
measure abnormal returns in selling shares to companies which offer to 
repurchase them via tender offers. Aboody and Kasznik(2000) and 
Narayanan and Seyhun (2005) used this model to estimate the abnormal 
stock returns around companies' option grants. 
Both Armitage (1995) and MacKinlay (1997) state that the index model can be 
viewed as a special case of the market model with ai constrained to be zero 
and 13; equal to one. Many model evaluation studies (Brenner, 1979; Brown 
and Warner, 1980; Brick, Statman and Weaver, 1989; Dyckman et al.) show 
that the index model and market model give similar results in modeling 
abnormal returns. In the index model, the coefficients are pre-specified, thus 
an arbitrary estimation period to obtain parameter estimates is not required, in 
particular some strong assumptions regarding the distributional properties of 
the residuals are avoided. 
Another approach used in event studies is the risk controlled portfolio returns. 
This approach involves the "grouping of firms according to the estimated 
security price reaction preceding the calculation of excess returns. For each 
portfolio of firms developed by the grouping, weights are determined for each 
firm so as to ensure that the weighted portfolio will have a beta equal to one. 
Then, individual firms' returns are calculated, weighted and aggregated into 
portfolios. The abnormal return for the portfolio is the difference between this 
51 
portfolio return and the market return." (Bowman, 1983). This approach was 
tested by Brown and Warner (1980). The paper indicates that the procedure 
performs poorly relative to the other methods described above. In light of this 
result it is difficult to defend any further the use of this method. 
4.2 Choosing a method in this study 
From the literature, of the four main methods used in event studies, there is no 
concluded most preferred methodology. 
In choosing a method for this study, the issues below were taken into 
consideration: 
~ Issue of Market efficiency 
Research into the efficiency of the JSE has been popular but inconclusive from 
academics and post-graduate students. Page and Way (1992) indicate 
substantial weak form inefficiencies of the South African stock market in the 
long term. Wessels and Krige (2005) and Bradfield and Swartz (2001) found 
that the persistence in returns of professional fund managers over long periods 
tend to disappear or decline. The relatively small number of shares listed on 
the JSE and the existence of many closely held and thinly traded shares make 
it difficult to argue that the JSE is an efficient market. 
~ Performance of JSE 
Over the last five years, the JSE all share index has tripled. The yearly 
average closing index from 8,817 in 2001 increased dramatically to 21,217 in 
2006. The huge increase of market index may result in less reliability in the 
parameters of the market model and CAPM. 
In addition, the long experienced bull market might produce upwardly biased 
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abnormal returns in using the average return model. 
>- Event dates 
The event date for this study is the option grant date. Share option grant dates 
in a particular firm vary over time. The different event dates might cause the 
average return model to perform badly. 
>- Specification of sample 
For liquidity reasons, the sample used in this study has been specified as the 
large market capitalization listed companies (top 41 of the JSE) on the South 
African market. This specification of the sample might make the use of the 
Three-factor model meaningless. 
In reviewing prior studies and the issues addressed above, among other 
reasons (the additional reasons are stated below), the index model is 
considered desirable and is used in this. 
>- Results in modeling abnormal returns. 
Many model evaluation studies (Brenner, 1997; Brown and Warner, 1980; 
Brick, Statman and Weaver, 1989;· Dyckman et al.) have shown that the index 
model and market model give similar results in modeling abnormal return. 
>- Beta 
Prior studies (Gregory-Allen, Impson and Karafiath, 1994; Coutts, 1994) have 
indicated that beta is inherently unstable and is subject to fluctuation. It is 
known that betas tend to regress towards their mean of one. In the index 
model, the coefficients of alpha and beta are pre-specified with alpha is equal 
to zero and beta is equal to one, thus avoid making any arbitrary estimation 
and adjustments of the coefficients. 
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» The most used model in option grants studies 
Prior studies which have similar objectives to this study used three different 
models to estimate the excess return around the share option grants. The 
most used is the index model. It was chosen by Aboody and Kasznik(2000) 
and Narayanan and Seyhun (2005). The other two models are the market 
model and the three-factor model, they were chosen by Yermack (1997) and 
Erik Lie (2005, 2006a), respectively. Both Armitage (1995) and Mackinlay 
(1997) state that the index model can be viewed as a special case of the 
market model. As stated above, the specification of the sample (large market 
capitalization) in this study might make the use of the Three-factor model 
meaningless. 
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Chapter V Data 
5.1 Data 
In South Africa, the implementation of IFRS 2 with regards to share based 
payment requires companies to disclose shares, share options or other equity 
instruments granted after 7 November 2002 in their annual financial reports. It 
is not a mandatory requirement to disclose option grant dates in the annual 
report, but the grant dates can sometimes be inferred from the stated maturity 
dates and strike price in combination with information about the vesting period 
and first exercisable date. Generally, companies give two years information in 
their annual reports, therefore, the sample includes the options made during 
2001 to 2006. 
The top 41 companies examined are selected from the Profile's Stock 
Exchange Handbook (February 2007 - May 2007)44, which lists the top 163 
shares of the JSE as at 30 November 2006 by market capitalization. The 
sample of share option grants to executives was extracted directly from five 
consecutive annual reports (2002 to 2006) of each of the companies under 
examination. These annual reports were downloaded from the McGregor BFA 
library database. This database provides JSE-listed company annual reports 
from 1995 and contains a complete, electronic source of investor disclosure 
information for JSE-listed companies. Among the top 41 companies under 
investigation, there is one company (Kumba Iron Ore Ltd) listed on the JSE on 
20 November 2006 for which no annual report was found in the database; two 
companies provide no share option information45• The initial sample contains 
44 Published by Profile Media, 22 Eleventh Avenue, Houghton Estate, Johannesburg 2198, SA 
45 There is no share option information contained in the annual reports of Telcom SA Ltd. 
Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd (PPC) indicates that the executive directors participate in 
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212 option grants to executive directors made by 38 companies during the 
fiscal years from 2001 through 2006. Of the 212 option grants, 33 grants made 
by 6 companies lack enough detailed information to infer the grant date with 
confidence46 , 4 grants lack daily share price data around the grant date. By 
excluding the 37 grants stated above, the final sample of 175 executive stock 
option grants made by 32 companies during 2001 to 2006 is obtained and 
examined. These 175 executive stock option grants represent in-the-money, 
at-the-money and out-the-money grants, scheduled and unscheduled grants. 
Following Erik Lie (2005) and Narayana (2005), the final sample of 175 option 
grants is further classified into two groups - scheduled and unscheduled grants. 
An option grant is defined as scheduled if it has been granted at the same day 
as the previous year's grant date. According to this classification, there are 150 
unscheduled and 25 scheduled grants. 
Appendix 2 provides the summary statistics of 175 share option grants made 
by 32 companies during year 2001 through 2006. It can be seen that both the 
number of companies granting options to executive directors and the number 
of share option grants have reduced in the final 2 years of the sample. The 
number of option grants dropped from 39 grants in 2003 to 15 grants in 2006. 
There are 26 firms indicating option grants in 2002 through 2004. This figure 
dropped to 10 firms in 2006. The volume of shares per grant exhibits a similar 
pattern. The average number of shares per grant in 2002 is 941,582 shares, 
dropping to 357, 788 shares in 2006. 47 Narayanan (2005) shows similar 
findings. 
the share option scheme of the parent company, Barloworld Limited, thus there is no share option 
information provided in its annual reports. This paper considers these two companies to have no 
share option grants. 
46 Some companies did not provide detailed option granting dates, and there is no additional 
information available to infer these dates. Some companies disclose global information in respect 
of share option grants, it is difficult to separate the executive option grants form the other grants. 
47 The statistics exclude the 37 option grants with insufficient information for analysis. 
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In the reviewed literature relating to the timing of share option grants, the event 
study methodology is most frequently used. Of the four main models used in 
event studies, as discussed in chapter four, the index model is chosen for the 
purpose of this study. 
The index model presumes that the expected returns are equal across the 
securities. The abnormal return of a share is equal to the difference between 
its return and that of the market portfolio. The JSE all share index (J200) is 
employed as the market portfolio term in the model. 
Daily share price data for the sample companies and the JSE all share index 
are obtained from the McGregorBFA database. 
5.2 Relevant terminology 
The relevant terminology is summarized below: 
• Abnormal stocks return (AR). Abnormal stock returns are computed as 
the difference between the with-dividend return of shares and the 
with-dividend return of the JSE all share index: 
Where ARit is the abnormal stock return to stock i for day t, n1 is the 
with-dividend return to share i for day t, rm1 is the with-dividend return to 
market portfolio of the JSE all share index for day t. 
Certain companies under consideration have primary listings in foreign 
countries, consequently in some instance options strike prices are reported 
in pounds, Swiss francs or dollars. As this study focuses on the share 
return behavior before and after the date of option grants, foreign currency 
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strike prices pose no problem for such analyses. The method of estimating 
the excess returns for such dual-listed companies are the same as for the 
other companies, i.e. the closing prices of these shares on the JSE are 
used to compute the stock returns, and then compared to the return of the 
JSE all share index. 
• Average abnormal return (AAR). Daily abnormal returns are averaged 
over the sample of option grants yielding the average abnormal return 
(AAR). 
} N 
AAR = -I ARit 
N i=I 
Where N is the number of the option grants. 
• Cumulative abnormal return (CAR). The cumulative abnormal stock 
return is the sum of all the ARs of stock i over a holding period of trading 
days t starting from the grant date (date 0). 
T 
CARit = I ARit 
1=0 
Where tis the trading days of holding period, t= -30, -20, ... , +20, +30. 
• Average cumulative abnormal return ( CAR ). Cumulative abnormal 
returns are averaged over the sample of option grants yielding the average 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR). 
T } N 
CARt= I -IARit 
t=O N i=I 
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Average cumulative abnormal return is used to measure stock return 
behavior. 
• Event date. The event date is the option grant date, and t denotes the 
event time, i.e. t = -10, ... , +1 O; t = 0 denotes the event date. 
5.3 Methods of significance tests 
Two tests are utilized in this study. The first tests whether the average 
cumulative abnormal returns are significantly different from zero; the second 
tests whether a difference exists in the mean cumulative abnormal returns 
between the pre- and post-grant periods. 
5.3.1 T test where population mean and standard deviation are unknown 
To determine whether or not the average cumulative abnormal returns are 
significantly different from zero, the t-test for population mean and standard 
deviation unknown is applied. 
The description of the t-test is from Keller and Warrack. "If the population mean 
and standard deviation are unknown, the sample standard deviation is 
substituted in its place ... the t statistic defined as: 
x-u 
t= s/ ,,Jn 
which is the Student t distribution with v = n-1 degree of freedom. where xis 
the mean of the sample, µ is the mean of the population, S is the standard 
deviation of the sample, n is the number in the sample. " 
In theory, the average cumulative abnormal return of the stock is zero. 
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Therefore the t statistic in this study is calculated as: 
CAR 
I ... ,,,~ = ;Jr,. 
where CAR is the mean of the cumulative abnormal return of the grants in 
that portfolio, Sr is the standard deviation of the portfolio; n is the number of 
grants in that portfolio. 
The hypothesis tested: 
Ho: CAR = 0 
is a two-tailed test. The t statistic is compared with the key t-value of n - 1 
degrees of freedom at a specific significant level a, expressed as t 1 • If (2a,n-J) 
t statistic > t 1 (2a,n-I) 
the null hypothesis will be rejected, which means the average cumulative 
abnormal return is significantly different from zero. 
5.3.2 Paired t test 
To determine whether differences in the mean cumulative abnormal returns 
exist between the two groups of pre- and post- grant periods, the t test of the 
mean difference between two paired observations is used. 
Assuming the two population variances are equal, 01 2 = al, Keller and 
Warrack defined the t test statistic for the matched pairs experiment as: 
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which is Student t distributed with v = n -1 degrees of freedom. where xd is 
the mean difference between two groups, µd is the mean difference between 
two populations, sd is the standard deviation of the differences of matched 
pairs in the two groups, n is the number of the paired observations. 
It is observed that the mean cumulative abnormal returns for the periods after 
the grant date are greater than before the grant date, CAR1 > CAR2 , the 
paired t test calculation for this study is calculated as: 
_CAR1 -CAR2 t statistic - ~ 
sd 
-.In 
where CAR1 and CAR2 are the mean cumulative abnormal returns for the after 
and before grant date groups, respectively. 
The hypothesis tested 
HO: CARI - CAR2 0 
H 1 : CARI - CAR2 > 0 
is a one-tailed test. The t statistic is compared with the key t-value of n - 1 
degrees of freedom at a specific significant level a, expressed as t<a,n-1>. If 
t t statistic > (a,n-I) 
the null hypothesis will be rejected, which means the mean cumulative 
abnormal returns for the periods after the grant date are greater than before 
the grant date. 
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Chapter VI Empirical results 
6.1 Average cumulative abnormal return patterns around option grant day 
Figure 1 shows the average cumulative abnormal return patterns around the 
option grant dates for the three groups, unscheduled grants (150 grants), 
scheduled grants (25 grants) and total sample (175 grants). FoUowing Chauvin 
and Shenoy {2000), 1 O and 5 trading days relative to the event date (the option 
grant date) were chosen. Figure 1(A) displays the return patterns for the 
holding period of_ 1 O days before to 1 O days after the option grant date; Figure 
1 (B) displays the return patterns for the holding period of 5 days before to 5 
days after the option grant date. 
Figure 1 Average cumulative abnormal return around share option grants 
Figure 1 (A) 
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Figure 1 (A) displays the average cumulative abnormal share returns from 10 days 
before through 10 days after share option grants to executives, Figure 1(8) displays 
the average cumulative abnormal share returns from 5 days before through 5 days 
after share option grants to executives. Abnormal share returns are estimated using 
the index model. The total sample of 175 grants is divided into 150 unscheduled and 
25 scheduled grants based on the grant date. A grant is classified as scheduled if it 
occurred at the same day as the prior year's grant date, and unscheduled if it did not 
occur at the same day as the prior year. 
The graphs clearly show the negative abnormal returns during 1 O days prior to 
the grant date and the upward trend following the grant date for the 
unscheduled grants, these trends are more pronounced for the holding period 
of 5 days before through 5 days after the grant date. A similar pattern appears 
in the total sample group for the holding period of 5 days before to 5 days after 
the grant date. Negative abnormal returns do not appear in the group of 
scheduled grants during the same holding period. 
Further, the unscheduled grants are partitioned into six groups based on the 
year of the grants. The return patterns for the holding period of 5 days before 
to 5 days after the grant day for the six groups are·graphed in Figure 2. 
63 
Figure 2 Average cumulative abnormal returns around option grant by year 
Figure 2 (A) 
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Figure 2 (A) and (8) display the average cumulative abnormal share returns from 5 
days before through 5 days after share option grants to executives for 150 
unscheduled grants during 2001 to 2006. Abnormal share returns are estimated using 
the index model. A grant is classified as scheduled if it occurred at the same day as 
the prior year's grant date, and unscheduled if it did not occur at the same day as the 
prior year 
It can be seen from the Figure 2 that a pronounced pattern of negative 
cumulative abnormal returns before the grant date and positive immediately 
afterwards appears each year except in 2003 and 2004. Negative cumulative 
abnormal returns also appear 3 to 5 days after the grant days in year 2005 and 
2006. 
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6.2 Abnormal returns around option grants 
Table 1 gives the mean and median cumulative abnormal returns for the 
scheduled and unscheduled grants. The mean and median CARs are reported 
for holding periods [r, O] for r = -30, -20, -10, -9, -8, ... ,-2 and -1, and for 
holding periods [1, t+] fort= +30, +20, +10, +9, +8, ... ,+2 and +1. For the 
sub-sample of unscheduled grants, the means and medians are computed 
across 150 unscheduled grants; for the sub-sample of scheduled grants, the 
means and medians are calculated across 25 scheduled grants. 
Table 1 Mean and Median cumulative abnormal returns 
This table shows the mean and median cumulative abnormal returns for an event 
period around the dates of share option grants. The t statistics for the null hypothesis 
that the mean cumulative abnormal return equals zero are shown. The table also 
shows the percentage of grants which had positive cumulative abnormal returns over 
the period. The sample contains 150 unscheduled grants and 25 scheduled grants. A 
grant is classified as scheduled if it occurred on the same day as the prior year's grant 
date, and unscheduled if it did not occur on the same day as the prior year.***,** and 
* are significant at 1 % level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively. 
Unscheduled grants Scheduled grants 
Holding 
Mean CAR t-Statistic 
Median %CARs 
Mean CAR t-Statistic 
Median %CARs 
period CAR positive CAR positive 
(-;jV,0) 0.92% 1.17648 1.20% 54.00% 1.73% 0.81029 2.25% 60.00% 
(-20,0) 0.68% 0.93650 -0.22% 48.00% 1.08% 0.81711 1.04% 60.00% 
(-10,0) -0.14% -0.25603 -0.48% 46.67% 2.55% 1.85824 •• 1.91% 68.00% 
(-9,0) -0.11% -0.21406 0.02% 50.00% 2.53% 2.13103 •• 1.53% 64.00% 
(-8,0) -0.09% -0.18844 -0.08% 48.00% 2.39% 2.16890 ** 2.06% 72.00% 
(-7,0) 0.06% 0.13380 0.15% 50.00% 1.68% 1.39223 2.17% 68.00% 
(-6,0) -0.01% -0.01337 -0.32% 48.00% 1.58% 1.38432 1.49% 68.00% 
(-5,0) -0.29% -0.70282 -0.33% 46.67% 1.51% 1.45468 0.59% 68.00% 
(-4,0) -0.31% -1.37757 -0.15% 47.33% 1.80% 1.71817. 2.70% 64.00% 
(-3,0) -0.38% -1.00706 -0.31% 46.00% 1.58% 1.79513. 1.91% 64.00% 
(-2,0) -0.12% -0.39745 -0.07% 49.33% 1.77% 2.34294 •• 2.20% 76.00% 
(-1,0) -0.04% -0.16704 -0.10% 46.67% 1.72% 2.79248 *** 1.34% 72.00% 
GrantDate -0.08% -0.44779 -0.28% 45.33% 0.99% 2.23981 ** 0.56% 64.00% 
(1, 1) 0.36% 2.13862 ** 0.22% 59.33% 0.22% 0.58158 0.39% 56.00% 
(1,2) 0.63% 2.94420 •• , 0.39% 59.33% 0.94% 1.42441 0.26% 52.00% 
(1,3) 0.86% 3.18056**' 0.50% 56.67% 0.94% 1.35020 0.70% 56.00% 
(1,4) 0.85% 2.67558 **' 0.60% 55.33% 0.48% 0.63912 0.14% 52.00% 
(1,5) 0.66% 1.98325 •• 0.51% 57.33% 0.66% 0.65318 -0.35% 44.00% 
(1,6) 0.55% 1.61684. 0.71% 57.33% 0.91% 0.84048 -0.31 % 48.00% 
(1,7) 0.39% 1.11024 0.44% 56.00% 1.00% 0.94974 -0.18% 48.00% 
(1,8) 0.47°/o 1.25750 0.59% 57.33% 1.15% 0.96619 0.14% 52.00% 
(1,9) 0.78% 1.99253 .. 0.93% 60.00% 1.03% 0.89226 0.10% 52.00% 
(1,10) 0.90% 2.22452 •• 0.46% 60.00% 1.02% 0.94264 0.03% 52.00% 
(1,20) 1.57% 2.95970 **' 1.25% 60.00% 4.12% 2.99530 .... 2.80% 80.00% 
(1,30) 2.12% 3.00249 •• , 2.71% 61.33% 5.23% 3.09609 ••• 3.13% 76.00% 
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For the unscheduled grants, it can be seen from Table 1 that the mean CARs 
are negative for all holding periods prior to the grant date except periods [-30, 
O] and [-20, O] and positive and increasing for all holding periods subsequent to 
the grant date. The median CARs follow a similar pattern. The mean 
cumulative abnormal return between day 1 and day 1 O is 0.90%, which is 
significant at the 5% level. The mean CARs for the holding periods of [1, 20] 
and [1, 30] are 1.57% and 2.12%, respectively, both are significant at the 1% 
level. The mean CARs for the holding periods of [-10, O], [-20, O] and [-30, O] 
are -0.14%, 0.68% and 0.92%, respectively, but are not significant. The 
number of the grants showing positive cumulative abnormal returns increases 
after the grant date as compared to before the grant date. During the 10 days 
period prior to the grant date, 46.67% of the 150 unscheduled grants report a 
positive cumulative abnormal return; during the 1 O day period after the grant 
date, 60% of the 150 unscheduled grants report a positive cumulative 
abnormal return. 
For the scheduled grants, the mean cumulative abnormal returns are positive 
for both the periods before and after the grant date. The average cumulative 
abnormal returns for the holding period of 20 and 30 trading days after the 
grant date are 4.12% and 5.23%, respectively, both being significant at the 1 % 
level. The average cumulative abnormal returns for the holding period of 20 
and 30 trading days prior to the grant date are 1.08% and 1. 73%, respectively, 
but are not significant. The numbers of the grants which have positive 
cumulative abnormal returns seem to appear random before and after the 
grant date as compared to the unscheduled grants. 
The result that there are no significant abnormal returns prior to option grants 
and significant abnormal returns afterwards is somewhat similar to that 
obtained by previous research - Yermack (1997) and Aboody and Kasznik 
(2000). These researchers have attributed their findings to executives timing 
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option grants relative to expected future price patterns. Both Erik Lie (2005) 
and Narayanan (2005) give the underlying reasons to explain the insignificant 
abnormal returns leading up to the option grants for the earlier studies: 
1. Sample period. The sample periods covered by Yermack (1997) and 
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) are 1992 -1994 and1992-1996, respectively, 
which are short compared to that covered by Erik Lie (2005) and Narayanan 
(2005). The two later studies extend the sample period from 1992 to 2002. 
2. Number of firms in the sample. Narayanan (2005)'s sample includes more 
than 5,000 firms; Erik Lie (2005) takes his sample from S&P's ExecuComp 
database which includes more than 2,000 companies. The number of firms 
in their sample are significantly greater compared to the 500 firms in 
Yermack (1997) and the 1,304 firms in Aboody and Kasznik (2000). 
3. Focus on larger firms. Both Yermack (1997) and Aboody and Kasznik (2000) 
have focused on larger firms. Narayanan (2005) documented that the stock 
price behavior is much stronger for smaller firms. Therefore, Narayanan 
(2005) includes all firms in his sample. 
This study covers a 6 years period (2001-2006), selects 41 companies which 
are large market capitalization and obtains data of 175 executive option grants. 
Similarly to these earlier studies, the limitations of this study also show no 
evidence of significant abnormal stock returns prior to the option grants. 
It is also interesting to note that the mean CARs for the holding periods of 20 
and 30 trading days after the grant date for the sub-sample of scheduled 
grants ( 4.12% and 5.23%, respectively) are higher (with similar t-statistics) 
than for the sub-sample of unscheduled grants (1.57% and 2.12%, 
respectively). 
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To check the consistency of the share price behavior, the mean differences of 
cumulative abnormal returns between pre- and post- grant periods are tested 
as presented below. 
6.3 Mean differences of CARs between pre· and post- grant 
periods 
Table 2 reports the mean differences in the cumulative abnormal returns 
between pre- and post- grant periods. The difference in CARs between the two 
periods before and after the grant date, is computed at the same interval, i.e. 
[-29, O] and [1, 30], [-19, O] and [1, 20], etc, and compared. 
Table 2: Mean differences in cumulative abnormal returns 
This table shows the mean differences in cumulative abnormal returns between pre-
and post- grant periods. The t statistics with their p value for the null hypothesis where 
the mean differences in cumulative abnormal returns between pre- and post- grant 
periods equals zero are reported. The total sample contains 175 option grants and the 
sub-sample includes 150 unscheduled grants. A grant is classified as scheduled if it 
occurred on the same day as the prior year's grant date, and unscheduled if it did not 
occur on the same day as the prior year. 






t statistic p value 
periods periods difference 
(-29,0) 1.11% (1,30) 2.54% 1.43% 1.4686 * 0.06941 
(-19,0) 0.69% (1,20) 1.93% 1.24% 1.5352 * 0.06369 
(-9,0) 0.27% (1, 10) 0.92% 0.65% 1.0699 0.14034 
(-8,0) 0.26% (1,9) 0.81% 0.55% 0.9637 0.17346 
(-7,0) 0.29% (1,8) 0.57% 0.28% 0.4817 0.31310 
(-6,0) 0.22% (1, 7) 0.48% 0.26% 0.4659 0.31587 
(-5,0) -0.04% (1,6) 0.60% 0.64% 1.1632 0.10623 
(-4,0) -0.11% (1,5) 0.66% 0.77% 1.4664 * 0.05817 
(-3,0) -0.10% (1,4) 0.80% 0.90% 1.8679 ** 0.02467 
(-2,0) 0.15% (1,3) 0.88% 0.73% 1.8089 ** 0.03008 
{-1,0} 0.21% {1,2} 0.68% 0.47% 1.4727 * 0.06916 
*** Significant at 1 % level 
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level 
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t statistic p value periods periods difference 
(-29,0) 1.06% (1,30) 2.12% 1.06% 1.0730 0.15590 
(-19,0) 0.72% (1,20) 1.57% 0.85% 0.9870 0.17050 
(-9,0) -0.11 % (1, 10) 0.90% 1.01% 1.6174* 0.05947 
(-8,0) -0.09% (1,9) 0.78% 0.87% 1.4939 * 0.08250 
(-7,0) 0.06% (1,8) 0.47% 0.41% 0.7065 0.24683 
(-6,0) -0.01% (1,7) 0.39% 0.40% 0.7007 0.24389 
(-5,0) -0.29% (1,6) 0.55% 0.84% 1.5152 * 0.05937 
(-4,0) -0.43% (1,5) 0.66% 1.09% 2.0047 ** 0.01752 
(-3,0) -0.38% (1,4) 0.85% 1.23% 2.4194 *** 0.00644 
(-2,0) -0.12% (1,3) 0.86% 0.98% 2.3169 *** 0.00885 
{-1,0~ -0.04% {1,2} 0.63% 0.67% 2.0297 ** 0.02111 
*** Significant at 1 % level 
** Significant at 5% level 
* Significant at 10% level 
Panel A shows the mean differences for the total sample of 175 grants. The 
mean differences of CARs between the holding period of (1, 3) and (-2, 0), (1, 
4) and (-3, 0) are 0.73% and 0.90%, respectively, which are significant at the 
5% level. The mean differences between the holding period of (1, 5) and (-4, 0), 
(1, 20) and (-19, O), (1, 30) and (-29, 0) are 0.77%, 1.24% and 1.43%, 
respectively, which are significant at the 10% level. 
Panel B shows the mean differences in cumulative abnormal returns for the 
150 unscheduled grants. The mean differences between the holding period of 
(1, 3) and (-2, 0), (1, 4) and (-3, 0) are 0.98% and 1.23%, which are significant 
at the 1 % level. The mean difference between the holding period of (1, 2) and 
(-1, 0), (1, 5) and (-4, 0) are 0.67% and 1.09%, respectively, which are 
significant at the 5% level. 
69 
Chapter W Summary and Conclusions 
The backdating of stock option grants has attracted a great deal of attention 
from both academics and regulators. It has dominated busihess page 
headlines during the summer of 2006 in the U.S. Both regulators and 
academics indicate that the backdating inquiry could be one of the most 
widespread and significant corporate scandals in 30 years. 
This study examines the timing of executive share option awards in the South 
African market. A sample of 175 share option grants to executives of the JSE 
top 41 companies between 2001 and 2006 is extracted and analyzed. A 
pattern of negative cumulative abnormal stock returns before the grant dates 
but positive and increasing thereafter appears. This pattern is much more 
pronounced for the unscheduled grants. Statistical testing shows the mean. 
cumulative abnormal returns are significantly different from zero after the grant 
date, but are insignificantly different from zero before the grant date. The mean 
differences in average cumulative abnormal stock returns between pre- and 
post- grant periods are significantly different. 
The result is somewhat similar to that obtained by previous research (Yermack, 
1997; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Erik Lie, 2005) and would suggest that some 
opportunistic behavior might have been taken around the executive option 
grants, including backdating. Both the pattern of negative CARs before the 
grant dates but positive and increasing afterwards, and the significant mean 
differences in CARs between the pre- and post- grant periods are consistent 
with this conclusion. It is however also found that the mean CARs at the 
holding periods of 20 and 30 trading days after the grant date for the 
sub-sample of scheduled grants are higher (with similar t-statistics) than for the 
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sub-sample of unscheduled grants. There is rio reference to this finding has 
been recorded in the previous studies. 
This study contributes to the literature on backdating stock options in South 
Africa by providing evidence consistent with executives manipulating the 
timing of share option grants. This study also is relevant to executive 
compensation, in that it suggests that executives have compensation-related 
incentives to manage their own compensation to their advantage. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: List of Companies under Examination 
Company's full name 
Share Code on 
the JSE 
1 Anglo American Pie AGL 
2 BHP Billiton Pie BIL 
3 SABMiller Pie SAB 
4 Richemont Securities AG RCH 
5 Anglo platinum Ltd AMS 
6 Sasol Ltd SOL 
7 MTN group Ltd MTN 
8 Old Mutual Pie OML 
9 Standard Bank Group Ltd SBK 
10 FirstRand Ltd FSR 
11 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd IMP 
12 Anglo Gold Ashanti Ltd ANG 
13 Absa Group Ltd ASA 
14 Telkom SA Ltd TKG 
15 Remgro Ltd REM 
16 Gold Fields Ltd GFI 
17 Liberty International PLC LBT 
18 Nedbank Group Ltd NED 
19 Hormony Gold Mining Company Ltd HAR 
20 Naspers Ltd NPN 
21 Sanlam Ltd SLM 
22 Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd MLA 
23 the Bidvest Group Ltd BVT 
24 RMB Holdings Ltd RMH 
25 Kumba iron ore Ltd KIO 
26 Investec Pie INP 
27 Imperial Holdings Ltd IPL 
28 Barloworld BAW 
29 Sappi Ltd SAP 
30 Tiger Brands Ltd TBS 
31 Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd SHF 
32 Network Healthcare Holdings Ltd NTC 
33 Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd ECO 
34 Liberty Group Ltd LGL 
35 Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd PPC 
36 Exxar6(Kumba)Resources Ltd EXX 
37 Investec Ltd INL 
38 Reunert Ltd RLO 
39 Pick'n Pay stores Ltd PIK 
40 African bank investments Ltd ABL 
41 JD Group Ltd JOG 
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Appendix 2: Option Grants Volume During 2001 to 2006 
number of number of shares average shares number of 
year 
grants granted per grant firms 
2001 29 24,238,060 835, 795 22 
2002 36 33,896,935 941,582 26 
2003 39 36,022, 730 923,660 26 
2004 35 17,833,421 509,526 26 
2005 21 14,470,356 689,065 15 
2006 15 5 366 816 357 788 10 
Total 175 131 828 318 753 305 
The table provides the summary statistics of 175 share option grants made by 
32 companies during year 2001 through 2006. Total shares granted are the 
shares that the optionees will receive upon exercise of the options. Number of 
firms indicates the firms that awarded options. 
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